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Post–peace accord Colombia is full of paradoxes. Progress in political partici-
pation, in inclusion, and heightened social mobilisation are unfolding against 
a backdrop of persistent violence and insecurity. While the end of the war 
with the FARC-Ep has enabled relevant democratic advances, the lack of im-
plementation regarding the peace accord as well as the current government’s 
policies raise serious concerns about the prospects for peace and democracy. 
 • The peace agreement between the state and FARC-Ep guerrillas has been a con-
tested subject in Colombian politics. Although the transition has been far from 
smooth, it has enabled opportunities for peacebuilding and shifted the public 
debate towards issues such as inequality and corruption.
 • Amid this transitional context, President Iván Duque’s government has not 
managed to develop a political project according to the post-accord scenario. 
Unable to either please the most radical factions of his right-wing party, Demo-
cratic Centre, or to build a government in line with the demands of the Colom-
bian citizenry, Duque’s approval rating has plummeted to just 23 per cent.
 • Social discontent manifested on the streets in the form of mass demonstrations 
at the end of 2019. While the demands made point to long-standing problems, 
the shortcomings of the current government have led to discontent being chan-
nelled through the figure of Duque specifically. A salient trait of the protests is 
the participation of the urban, middle class, and youth. 
 • Meanwhile, violence has not come to a halt. A reconfiguration of non-state 
armed actors and the emergence of further violence are taking place in different 
localities against the backdrop of the structural factors that the peace process 
never resolved. The Colombian government has also failed to protect the lives 
of social leaders and former FARC-Ep combatants.
Policy Implications
The response of the government to citizens’ demands raises serious concerns 
about both the governance capabilities of President Duque and the repercussions 
thereof for the already undermined credibility of the Colombian state and its 
democratic institutions. Complicating matters, the half-hearted implementation 
of the peace agreement and the persistence of violence suggest a grim outlook. 
In the face of all this, it is crucial to support the efforts of actors committed to 
peacebuilding endeavours.
Viviana García Pinzón
Research Fellow
viviana.garciapinzon@giga- 
hamburg.de
GIGA German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale  
und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21  
20354 Hamburg
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
   2    GIGA FoCUS | LATIN AMERICA | No. 2 | MARCh 2020 
An Incomplete Peace
In December 2016 the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Co-
lombia, FARC-Ep), bringing an end to its 50-year war with the largest rebel group 
in the country. Given its comprehensive and innovative approach, the accord was 
praised by some sectors of Colombia society, by scholars, and by the international 
community. Undoubtedly, the agreement constituted an outstanding development 
in Colombia’s ongoing endeavours to end violence and build a strong democracy. 
Nonetheless, it has not since brought the peace that many Colombians expected it 
would. Positive developments such as disarmament of the FARC-Ep, its transfor-
mation into a political party, the creation of local development programmes with 
a focus on territorial peace, and progress on transitional justice contrast with the 
intensification of violence in certain areas of the country, the killing of social leaders 
and former combatants, and bitter turf wars among a plethora of criminal groups. 
Three years on from its signing, the assessment of the peace agreement yields a 
mixed view thereof.
As in any post-accord scenario, implementation has been a matter of contesta-
tion among the various stakeholders involved. however, particular political devel-
opments have made the situation even more challenging. The rejection of a first 
version of the peace deal by a slight margin in the plebiscite held in october 2016 
marked a major blow to the process. Even though both the government and the 
FARC-Ep promptly agreed on introducing relevant adjustments and signed a sec-
ond version that was ratified by Congress, the legitimacy of the accord was inexor-
ably undermined. Discontent with the agreement was capitalised on by political fac-
tions, particularly former president Álvaro Uribe and his political party Democratic 
Centre (Centro Democrático, CD) that opposed the peace process from the outset. 
Under the promise of introducing significant changes, CD’s candidate, Iván Duque, 
was elected president in 2018. Duque’s rise to power hampered the prospects for a 
thorough enforcement of the agreement. 
In contrast to traditional disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration 
(DDR) models that conceive former combatants’ reintegration as an individual pro-
cess, FARC-Ep envisioned their transition as being a collective endeavour. Thus, 
instead of using terms such as “demobilisation” and “reintegration,” they talked 
about “the [dismantling] of armed structures while remaining as a grouping” and 
“the reincorporation to the political system, instead of a reinsertion into the soci-
ety” (Zambrano Quintero 2019: 46). Such semantic distinctions aimed at highlight-
ing that the peace process marked the end of the FARC-Ep as a military apparatus 
but not as a political organisation and collective actor. In line with this, the group 
transitioned from being the FARC-Ep to become the Common Alternative Revo-
lutionary Force (Fuerza Armada Revolucionaria del Común, FARC) (Nussio and 
Quishpe 2019). 
In the initial phase, FARC laid down its weapons, launched the reincorporation 
process, and created a pollical party. With the assistance of the United Nations, 
arms were collected and decommissioned. FARC handed in a total of 8,994 weap-
ons and more than 1.7 million rounds of ammunition (UN 2017). In late 2016, FARC 
members moved to provisional settlement areas consisting of encampments where 
the troops were stationed. Later, some of these sites (plus other localities) were 
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adapted as “Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces” (Espacios Territori-
ales de Capacitación y Reincorporación, ETCRs). Problems and delays in the alloca-
tion of resources and infrastructure provision have prompted former combatants to 
move out of the ETCRs. To date, 12,940 persons are in the process of reincorpora-
tion – of these 9,275 live elsewhere to the ETCRs, 2,946 still dwell in them, while 
there is no official information on the whereabouts of the remaining 719 individu-
als (ARN 2020). The insecure situation of former combatants is a major concern, 
as some 173 have been killed since the signing of the agreement. Just weeks ago, 
heightened violence pushed the members of an ETCR in the municipality of Ituango 
(Department of Antioquia) to make the decision of leaving the space and relocating 
into a yet-to-be-decided new area.
Whereas the vast majority of former combatants are fully committed to the 
peace process, a small share refused to lay down their weapons prior to the peace 
deal being struck. The persistence and emergence of new dissident groups is a phe-
nomenon that has been increasing ever since. Rearmed factions add to the constel-
lation of remaining warring parties. In what constitutes one of the heaviest blows 
to both the FARC as a political organisation and to the peace process, after fleeing 
to an unknown location – most likely Venezuela – senior FARC commanders re-
leased a video in August 2019 announcing their decision to take up arms again. A 
group formed of lead negotiators for the FARC-Ep during the peace talks – such as 
Luciano Marín, known as Iván Márquez, and Seuxis Pausias hernández, known as 
Jesús Santrich, among other prominent leaders – called for a new era of rebellion 
and urged former comrades to join them. 
For the government, both the dissidents’ and the rearmed factions’ main mo-
tivation here is the capture of the rents from illegal economies such as drug traf-
ficking and clandestine gold mining. In contrast, rearmed combatants argue that it 
is the government’s “betrayal of the havana Peace Agreement” that has prompted 
their return to war. While criminal economies certainly do play a crucial role and 
will keep shaping the dynamics of violent conflict to a significant extent, to fully dis-
card the political aspects would be a mistake. historical mistrust of the Colombian 
state aroused suspicion among some FARC-Ep combatants at the time about the 
possibilities of reaching an agreement, and also its subsequent implementation. In 
this regard, the lack of compliance by the Colombian government and the animos-
ity towards the agreement demonstrated by Duque’s administration have fuelled 
disenchantment among ex-FARC-Ep fighters – and being taken to validate their 
decision to renounce the process. 
FARC’s current situation illustrates the struggle of former guerrillas to main-
tain their unity and cohesion in post-accord settings. Although the majority remain 
committed to the peace process, the exacerbation of internal tensions with the split 
in leadership between those remaining wedded to the ongoing process and those 
seeking to rearm – alongside the complex and challenging circumstances found at 
both the local and national levels – have the potential to jeopardise the future of the 
FARC as a political project, and the reincorporation of former combatants (Nussio 
and Quishpe 2019). 
The end of the FARC-Ep as an insurgent group is at the core of the peace agree-
ment, but the scope of it is nevertheless broader – as it also includes measures 
on comprehensive rural reform, political participation, ending the conflict, transi-
tional justice, and drugs policy. Figure 1 below displays the progress made in the 
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implementation of each of the six points of the accord up to April 2019 (Kroc Insti-
tute for International Peace Studies 2019). Whereas those areas related to the dis-
assembling of the guerrilla group’s military structure report the highest degree of 
progress, where little advancement has been made is in regard to structural trans-
formations – for instance, measures aimed at tackling rural marginality and under-
development. While it is true that the current government has no interest in pushing 
structural reforms, the lack of engagement with these kinds of changes goes back 
to the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018) – whose readiness to 
foster FARC-Ep’s disarmament and reincorporation sharply contrasted with his re-
luctance to engage with deep-rooted reforms. Although solving all social problems 
was clearly beyond the reach of the agreement, the shortfall in the implementation 
of structural reforms endangers one of the most valuable contributions thereof: its 
addressing of the socio-economic and political problems that lie at the heart of the 
(re)production of violence in Colombia. 
Despite its flaws, the peace deal has still had a significant political impact. At the 
local level, communities have benefitted from the ceasefire, with the end of armed 
confrontation. Likewise, through the advancing of notions such as “territorial 
peace,” the agreement has enabled new channels of participation for communities 
to emerge and has fostered the strengthening of local democracy. Post-accord Co-
lombia may not be the one that the most optimist supporters of the peace process 
envisioned; however, the end of the war with the FARC-Ep would usher in a new 
phase in Colombian politics regardless.
The Persistence of Violence and Insecurity
While the peace accord brought an end to the state’s conflict with one of the largest 
armed groups in Colombia, it regrettably has not meant the end of violence per se. 
In fact, struggles over the accord’s implementation have unfolded against the back-
drop of new waves of violence emerging in many areas of the country – notably in 
zones that were formerly under FARC-Ep control, and where drug crops and illegal 
mining are concentrated. Social movement and grass-roots leaders are, along with 
ex-FARC-Ep combatants, the main targets of violence, being those whose protec-
Figure 1 
Status of the Imple-
mentation of the 
Peace Agreement 
(April 2019)
Source: Kroc Institute 
for International Peace 
Studies 2019.
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tion and living conditions are at the core of the peace deal. Although there is varia-
tion in the statistics reported by different organisations, the death toll between 2016 
and 2018 amounted to at least 600 victims (Rozo and Ball 2019) – to which at least 
108 murders in 2019 alone must also be added (UN 2020). Likewise, the return of 
massacres and forced displacement evokes the worst times of violence. 
Rebel forces such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Na-
cional, ELN) and Popular Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Popular, EPL) 
along with organised crime and successor paramilitary groups make up the com-
plex constellation of armed groups active on the ground. The stepping back of the 
FARC-Ep left a power vacuum that these groups have tried to fill, leading to the 
reconfiguration of patterns of territorial control, disputes, and criminal alliances. 
State institutions have been unable to establish their authority and grant security 
to populations in the areas afflicted by enduring violence. Yet, to portray the cur-
rent situation as a problem restricted merely to a weak state incapable of dealing 
with competing armed actors would be profoundly misleading. Shady alliances with 
criminal groups and the reliance of the state and regional political and econom-
ic elites on non-state armed actors, notably paramilitary groups, form part of the 
breeding ground for violence. Although the state denies that paramilitary violence 
persists, groups of such ethos continue to curtail the implementation of the agree-
ment by targeting former FARC combatants, social leaders, and marginalised com-
munities. Enduring violence therefore not only results from entrenched criminal 
economies but constitutes also a resource that sectors whose interests would be 
undermined by structural reforms use against marginalised groups otherwise em-
powered by the peace process.
The current situation in Venezuela and its impacts in Colombia compound 
the violence and insecurity witnessed. on the one hand, Venezuela became a safe 
house for the ELN and EPL. Support from Nicolás Maduro’s government has fos-
tered favourable circumstances for the ELN’s expansion and strengthening in both 
countries. On the other hand, the massive influx of Venezuelan immigrants to Co-
lombia, totalling around 1.8 million people, has led to a humanitarian crisis and 
strained the already limited resources of the state to provide assistance. Contrary 
to the media depictions of migrants as a source of insecurity and crime, they have 
actually become victims of forms of violence and criminality already alive and well 
in Colombia. 
New Scenario, Old Strategies
When Duque came to power in August 2018, he found himself in a tricky position. 
having been elected on a platform largely based on opposition to the agreement, 
his party expected him to introduce substantial modifications to what they con-
sider flaws in the deal. However, the implementation of the agreement was already 
underway by then. An encompassing institutional structure had been created, its 
cornerstone being a set of legal instruments enshrined in the Constitution. Fur-
ther complicating matters, Duque’s lack of support from the majority of Congress 
represents a significant limitation to his endeavours to alter the peace deal. Unable 
to change the path set by the accord, Duque’s policies have been characterised by 
continuous contradictions and a stubborn insistence on governing with the same 
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strategies of his mentor, former president Uribe. This has not only hurt the peace 
process’s prospects, but also undermined the government’s capacity to tackle the 
country’s most pressing problems.
The dissonance between the government’s articulated attitude towards the 
peace agreement in the international arena on the one hand and in the domestic 
context on the other is one of the clearest instances of these contradictions. The 
international community backed the peace process from the outset, and has been 
closely involved in the accord’s implementation. Likewise, expectations of peace 
in Colombia improved the country’s economic profile and fostered the interest of 
international companies and investors in doing business there. Aware of this real-
ity, Duque has continuously expressed his support and commitment to the peace 
process in international fora. 
however, his pro-peace discourse rings hollow on the domestic stage. The gov-
ernment has sought to dismantle core aspects of the agreement, and set obstacles to 
its implementation. Its actions range from overt initiatives to more subtle gestures 
and symbolic actions. Among the most visible is the government’s crusade against 
the transitional justice system, notably the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdic-
ción Especial de Paz, JEP) that, according to its detractors, provides impunity for 
the FARC. At the beginning of 2019, Duque refused to sign the bill establishing the 
JEP’s legal framework – despite having already been approved by Congress and the 
Constitutional Court. Instead, in a controversial move, he objected to six important 
articles of the draft law and sent it back to Congress. In the end, both Congress and 
the Constitutional Court rejected the objections – leaving Duque with no option but 
to sign the bill. More subtle but equally perilous are the budgetary cuts and insuffi-
cient provision of personnel and political support for the various agencies in charge 
of implementing the accord. 
These actions have been framed by an overarching narrative that denies the 
existence of an armed conflict and posits instead that the problem of violence in Co-
lombia is about a state beset by terrorism and criminality. In concordance with this, 
Duque has opted for a hard-line approach in areas such as security and anti-narcot-
ics policies. his security policy resembles former president Uribe’s “Democratic Se-
curity” policy in many aspects. In this regard, human rights organisations and civil 
society actors have voiced their concerns about some of the measures adopted by 
the military, such as performance assessment based on deaths in combat – meaning 
the body count – that might lead to the repetition of infamous episodes of extra-
legal killings – known as “false positives” (Flórez 2019). 
As Figure 2 below shows, the volume of coca crops grown in Colombia has sky-
rocketed in recent years. The peace accord contains a whole section dedicated to the 
issue of illicit drugs that emphasises voluntary crop-substitution programmes and 
the improvement of underdeveloped local conditions. Going against this, and in 
line with the demands of the current United States administration, Duque decided 
to strengthen forced-eradication measures – with the increase of manual eradica-
tion, along with the return to aerial-spraying campaigns using the herbicide glypho-
sate. Aerial spraying had until then been suspended in Colombia since 2015 over 
health concerns. Likewise, the Constitutional Court set restrictions on the use of 
glyphosate from aircraft. Duque asked the Court to ease the measures in order to 
allow more spraying, but the Tribunal ruled to retain the restrictions.
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In pushing for this agenda, Duque has turned a deaf ear to citizens’ demands, 
further fuelling dissatisfaction. The war hit rural areas hardest, but problems such 
as poverty, inequality, corruption, and a lack of opportunities also affect people in 
the cities. For years, the impact of these issues was overshadowed by the immediacy 
of the war. Additionally, the FARC-Ep functioned as an all-purpose bogeyman that 
the government could invoke to explain away social discontent. This notion was 
central to the Democratic Security policy, the cornerstone of the – arguably ex-
tremely successful – political project of Uribe. 
With the peace process, however, this all-encompassing narrative lost its grip. In 
this context, diverse citizen agendas have gained visibility. Notably, the demands 
of the urban and of youth, whose main concerns relate more to socio-economic 
conditions than to the fight against an alleged terrorist threat. The exhaustion of 
this model and Duque’s inability to craft a government in line with the new cir-
cumstances has led to the noted sharp increase in his unpopularity, which reached 
73 per cent in February 2020 (Semana 2020). In the face of this, the streets have 
become the outlet for expressing citizens’ discontent. 
Social Mobilisation and Protests
The national strikes and ensuing demonstrations of late 2019 shook Colombian 
citizens and political elites alike, as the country had not witnessed such mass pro-
tests since 1977. These mobilisations brought forth diverse sections of Colombian 
society articulating a wide range of demands, from addressing the inadequate im-
plementation of the peace agreement to taking action against deteriorating socio-
economic conditions, the rejection of labour and pension system reforms, as well 
as the expression of concerns about the environment. While these demands point 
to long-standing problems, the shortcomings of the current government have led to 
discontent being channelled specifically through the figure of Duque. 
In the face of such protests, the government’s initial reaction was marked by the 
attempts to discredit the motives behind the national strikes – arguing supposed 
connections to left-wing extremists and Venezuela’s government, and denying that 
the government was planning any reform. Later, Duque accused the leader of the 
opposition, Gustavo Petro, of being behind the strikes in a move supposedly aimed 
Figure 2 
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at destabilising Duque’s government and Colombian democracy. Alongside its ef-
forts to generate suspicion about the motives and legitimacy of the mobilisations, 
the government relied also on the deployment of anti-riot police and military units 
to control the demonstrations and patrol the streets. Excessive use of force by the 
security apparatus resulted in the deaths of at least three citizens, while hundreds 
were injured (Deutsche Welle 2019). The dismissive and violent response from the 
government led to citizen outrage and even greater support for the strikes. In the 
face of this, Duque adopted a seemingly more conciliatory stance and called for the 
start of “a national conversation.”
Protests in Colombia are certainly connected to the broader wave of demonstra-
tions taking place throughout Latin America. Three decades after the “third wave 
of democratisation,” citizens are unsatisfied with their political leaderships and a 
democracy that does not live up to expectations; Colombia is no exception. Yet, the 
enabling conditions of the protests are to be found in the domestic context and in 
the changes that the end of the war against the FARC-Ep brought about. on the one 
hand, FARC guerrillas ceased to be at the heart of national concerns and politics. 
Instead, issues such as corruption and socio-economic conditions gained in rele-
vance (El Tiempo 2018). on the other hand, the hackneyed argument that such 
protests were instigated by the guerrillas and terrorists became obsolete with the 
peace process, opening up venues for heightened social mobilisation (Botero and 
otero 2019). 
As 2019 came to an end, the waves of protest lost their momentum – while the 
leaders of the strikes have been unable to create a coherent programme to underpin 
negotiations with the government. however, in the course of 2020 so far, govern-
ment spokespersons have timidly announced their intention to undertake reforms 
in areas such as the labour market and pension system, as noted underlying facets 
of protestors’ complaints – so it is to be expected that if the government does indeed 
go ahead with its proposed plans, citizens will return to the streets once more.
An Uncertain Road Ahead
The end of war with one actor is not tantamount to peace. This is especially true in 
contemporary Colombia, where the variety of armed groups and manifold linkages 
between order, the state, and violent entrepreneurs conjure a formidably complex 
setting. Undoubtedly, the peace agreement has contributed to peacebuilding and 
democracy. Nonetheless, structural problems remain and are igniting new waves of 
violence. Complicating matters, the potential and promises engendered by the ac-
cord’s comprehensive approach will not be fully developed as things stand given the 
current political set-up has curtailed the possibilities for its implementation. Given 
the impossibility of realising the accord entirely as envisaged, it is thus necessary 
to devote effort to the most relevant and strategic aspects of it. In particular, the 
reintegration of former combatants, programmes of local development, and tran-
sitional justice. 
However, armed violence is not the only expression of social conflict. Current 
government policies and their disconnect from the citizenry’s demands are fuelling 
social unrest. The repressive means employed by the government during the recent 
waves of protest raise concerns about the effects thereof on democracy and the le-
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gitimacy of state institutions in a moment where the strengthening of trust between 
the state and citizens is of paramount importance.
In the face of this, support being given to state institutions, political actors, and 
communities committed to peace is crucial. Peacebuilding efforts in Colombia have 
been sustained by committed domestic actors at the national and local levels, as 
well by the international community. Germany and the European Union have con-
tributed significantly to the peace process since the beginning. Amid the mutated 
forms of armed conflict and violence now being witnessed, international partners 
are being called to play a significant role – that by backing up the work of the insti-
tutions created within the framework of the peace agreement and of local develop-
ment projects, assisting in the provision of humanitarian aid for Colombian victims 
of violence and Venezuelan refugees alike, and supporting processes and initiatives 
to make civil society organisations in both rural and urban areas more influential. 
Factors such as Colombia’s positive economic outlook and the end of the war with 
one of the country’s historically most powerful guerrilla movements might suggest 
a story of success. however, failing to protect and nurture the achievements of the 
peace agreement will only continue to contribute to renewed cycles of violence and 
criminality. 
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